Law and Human Dignity: The Judicial Soul of Justice Brennan by Wermiel, Stephen J.
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 5
Law and Human Dignity: The Judicial Soul of
Justice Brennan
Stephen J. Wermiel
Copyright c 1998 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
Stephen J. Wermiel, Law and Human Dignity: The Judicial Soul of Justice Brennan, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill
Rts. J. 223 (1998), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol7/iss1/5
LAW AND HUMAN DIGNITY: THE JUDICIAL SOUL OF
JUSTICE BRENNAN
Stephen J. Wermiel*
The concept of human dignity has emerged in the United States in recent
decades as an important theoretical and sometimes practical source of individual
rights and liberties. Human dignity is cited in jurisprudential writings and discussed
in some court opinions as a means of enhancing the broad phrases of the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Essay examines the pivotal role that the late Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.,
played on the United States Supreme Court in making concepts of human dignity a
valued and essential part of rights formulation. This essay explores Justice
Brennan 's vision of the role that human dignity should play in our constitutional
system and evaluates criticism of this still controversial approach.
The Constitution, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. declared in a 1985 speech,' "is
a sublime oration on the dignity of man, a bold commitment by a people to the ideal
of libertarian dignity protected through law."2 This is a theme that Brennan began
to develop early in his Supreme Court tenure and that remained central for him
during his years on the bench. He used the theme more often in speeches than in
judicial opinions, and more often in both speeches and opinions in the second half
of his thirty-four year tenure on the United States Supreme Court. Over time it
became a profound moral vision, some would say even a radical one. It animated his
thinking and much of his judicial decision making, even when he did not specifically
use the words "dignity" or "human dignity." The purpose of this essay is to explore
This Essay is adapted from a lecture delivered at the William and Mary School of Law
on March. 19, 1998. The lecture was delivered under the auspices of the Institute of Bill of
Rights Law, and I am grateful to the Institute's director, Professor Davison M. Douglas, for
his support and encouragement. I completed the work for this Essay while I was a fellow at
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Ann Robinson
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Ratification, Delivered at Georgetown University Law Center (Oct. 12, 1985), in William
J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX.
L. REV. 433 (1986). This lecture also was reprinted as William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 35 RES IPSA LOQUITUR 4
(1985); and as William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States." Contemporary
Ratification, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2 (1985).
2 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986).
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the background of this concept, to elaborate on Justice Brennan's use of the idea, and
to touch briefly on thejurisprudential context of law and human dignity. The reason
for exploring this theme is that Brennan's moral vision was central to this nation's
thinking about constitutional rights and individual liberties in the second half of the
twentieth century. His vision was central to the elaboration of the meaning of the Bill
of Rights and to the evolution of the nation's understanding of the meaning of liberty
and due process, a major source of rights and liberties today.3
I. DIGNITY: TRADITIONAL MEANING
In some respects the word "dignity" is a paradox, both in its dictionary definition
and in its track record of Supreme Court usage. The dictionary defines dignity as,
among other things, "self-respect."4 But the dictionary also defines dignity in terms
of "nobility."5 In today's world, no one seriously would contend that self-respect is
reserved for the nobility. Yet, the equation of dignity with nobility is most likely a
historically accurate observation, one that Brennan and others helped to change;
indeed, Brennan argued that it was the self-respect of all persons with which he was
concerned.6 His was an equal opportunity dignity.
There is a much greater paradox that is more significant for examining the legacy
of Justice Brennan. The United States Supreme Court used the term "dignity" in 578
cases in the 167 years before Justice Brennan took his place on the bench in 1956. 7
In the overwhelming majority of those cases-552 of the 578, or 95.5%-the
Supreme Court used the word "dignity" in one of six ways. Most commonly, the
Court referred to the dignity of the state implicated in a case,8 or to the dignity of a
sovereign.' The word "dignity" also was part of the standard grand jury felony
' Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe captured Brennan's centrality when he wrote:
"Justice Brennan played the pivotal role in... building an enduring edifice of common sense
and uncommon wisdom that transformed the landscape of America." Laurence H. Tribe, In
Memoriam: William J Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 1, 43 (1997).
4 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 522 (3d ed. 1992).
Id.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 47-104.
7 This statistic is based on a search of Westlaw and LEXIS, using the word "dignity" as
the search term and then spot-checking dozens of opinions to ascertain the word's usage. A
very helpful and thoughtful earlier study of this field examined several variations of the
phrase "human dignity," but not past usage of the word "dignity" alone. See Jordan J. Paust,
Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria
and Content, 27 How. L.J. 145 (1984).
8 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). Discussing the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution, Chief Justice John Marshall commented, "We must ascribe
the amendment, then, to some other cause than the dignity of a State." Id. at 406.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Bank of N.Y. & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463 (1936). Ruling that
the federal government needed to bring an action in New York state court rather than federal
court, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote, "We cannot see that there would be
impairment of any rights the United States may possess, or any sacrifice of its proper dignity
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indictment language."° This use of "dignity" remains standard language in the grand
jury indictments of many state statutes or state constitutions today." Next, not
surprisingly, the Court displayed concern for the dignity and authority of courts. 2
Another frequent use of the word "dignity" was in patent cases in which the item in
question lacked "the dignity of invention."' 3 In addition, the Court referred to the
validity of a legal claim, usually concerning a debt or property, such as when a claim
for land was entitled to equal dignity with another claim. 4 Finally, the case history
is filled with references to stature-the dignity of an argument," for example-or to
status, such as the dignity of citizenship. 6
.Sometimes this usage produced surprising results or, more aptly, omissions. In
the Dred Scott 7 case and Lochner v. New York 8 -cases in which it might seem by
today's standards that the concept of individual dignity would have been
relevant-the Court did not use the term "dignity" anywhere. Another likely
candidate for airing the concept of individual dignity, Plessy v. Ferguson,9 includes
only a passing reference, in the dissent of Justice John Marshall Harlan, to the
Fourteenth Amendment's contribution to the "dignity and glory of American
citizenship."2 Seeming omissions abound in cases that use "dignity" in stock
indictment language. In 1860, when a free black man, Willis Lago, was charged with
as a sovereign, if it prosecuted its claim in the appropriate forum where the funds are held."
Id. at 480-81.
'0 See, e.g., Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). Justice John Marshall Harlan,
ordering a new trial for Kirby for the theft of postage stamps, cited the language of the
indictment as an offense "against the peace and dignity of the United States." Id. at 49.
" See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-221 (Michie 1995) (specifying that indictments for
murder and manslaughter shall close with the words "against the peace and dignity of the
Commonwealth"); see also N.J. CONST. art. 10, 3 (West 1971) ("All indictments shall
conclude: 'against the peace of this State, the government and dignity of the same"').
12 See, e.g, Exparte Secombe, 60 U.S. (1 How.) 9 (1856). Chief Justice Roger Taney,
refusing to reinstate a Minnesota lawyer to practice in that state's courts, made reference to
the "rights and dignity of the court itself." Id. at 13.
" See, e.g., Magin v. Karle, 150 U.S. 387 (1893). Rejecting the patentability of a beer-
cooling device, Justice Howell Jackson wrote, "This change in the apparatus does not rise
to the dignity of invention such as would entitle him to a patent." Id. at 392.
" See, e.g., Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. (1 Pet.) 436 (1839). Justice John Catron, ruling
in a Missouri land dispute, wrote "[W]e deny that the states have any power to declare
certificates of purchase of equal dignity with a patent." Id. at 451.
'" See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936). Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes reinstated a criminal conviction and rejected a challenge to certain jurors because
"[i]t does not rise to the dignity of an argument." Id. at 150.
6 See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). Justice William Day, describing
the Fourteenth Amendment, said former slaves were "raised to the dignity of citizenship."
Id. at76.
" Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
18 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
19 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
20 Id. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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a crime for inducing a slave to escape, the Supreme Court used the word "dignity"
in its decision.2 Despite the circumstances of the case, the use of the word did not
pertain to a person; dignity appeared only in the indictment for breaching the "peace
and dignity of the Commonwealth of Kentucky."22 Similarly, when the Supreme
Court upheld Oregon's law limiting the working hours of women in Muller v.
Oregon23 early in this century, the only use of the word "dignity" was in the
indictment of a laundry manager who made a woman work more than ten hours in
a day "against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon."24
The search for the precursors to Justice Brennan and his vision of human dignity
is not all so bleak. The first Supreme Court reference to individual dignity came
early in the Court's history. In the early jurisdictional case of Chisholm v. Georgia,25
which spawned the Eleventh Amendment, Justice James Wilson wrote of the dignity
of the individual. Although he did not use the phrase specifically to, suggest an
independent source of rights, Wilson recognized that "[a] State; useful and valuable
as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man; and from his native dignity
derives all its acquired importance."26
A comparatively more modem predecessor to Brennan may be found in Justice
Stephen Field. In the 1896 case of Brown v. Walker,27 Field became the first member
of the Supreme Court in more than 100 years to refer to individual dignity.
Dissenting from the majority's rejection of a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
argument, Field referred to the "sentiment of personal self-respect, liberty,
independence and dignity which has inhabited the breasts of English speaking
peoples for centuries.
2g
The great Justices of the first half of this century-Harlan, Holmes, Brandeis,
and Cardozo-never used "dignity" to refer directly to the self-respect of an
individual. However, there may be a subtle point of distinction to make. Use of the
term "dignity" to apply to individuals generally denotes an approach that is protective
of individual liberty; and it is certainly possible to take positions in Supreme Court
cases supporting individual liberties without actually using the word "dignity." In
1947, Justice Felix Frankfurter noted in Adamson v. California29 that a number of his
most respected predecessors wisely had rejected application of the Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination clause and other Bill of Rights provisions to the states, although
they were "judges who were alert in safeguarding and promoting the interests of
liberty and human dignity through law."3 ° He named, among others, Holmes,
21 See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860).
22 Id at 67.
23 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
24 Id. at417.
25 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
26 Id. at 455 (emphasis omitted).
27 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
28 Id. at 632 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
29 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
30 Id. at 62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Brandeis, and Cardozo.3" This characterization must be correct. Surely, Justice
Cardozo'.s standard, in Palko v. Connecticut,32 for applying to the states those
guarantees of the Bill of Rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"33
was a means of talking about the human dignity implicit in the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of due process. Notwithstanding this point, it is striking that
none of these Justices apparently ever used the phrase "human dignity" in an opinion.
It was not until the 1940s that the phrase "individual dignity" began to have some
regular constitutional currency.34 It is too cumbersome to go through the entire
period; a few examples will make the point. Serving from 1940 to 1949, Justice
Frank Murphy advocated most forcefully, consistently, and directly the tradition to
which Brennan became heir in the 1960s and beyond. Dissenting in Screws v.
United States,35 in which the majority ordered a new trial for a local sheriff convicted
in a civil rights prosecution for the beating death of a black man, Murphy wrote of
the "fair treatment that befits the dignity of man, a dignity that is recognized and
guaranteed by the Constitution. ' '36 The following year, in a concurring opinion,
Murphy decried racism because "[i]t renders impotent the ideal of the dignity of the
human personality, destroying something of what is noble in our way of life."37 He
also provided the first Supreme Court use of the phrase "human dignity" in a
dissenting opinion the same year.38
It is worth noting that Murphy's use of the concept of individual dignity roughly
coincides with the emergence of the idea of human dignity on the international scene.
Both the United Nations Charter3 9 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
40
make reference to the concept of dignity in all persons."
"' See id.
32 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
33 Id. at 325.
3' There are several thorough explorations of the background and origins of the concept
of human dignity. See generally Paust, supra note 7 (examining trends in the use of and
problems presented by judicial employment of the concept of "human dignity"). See also THE
CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTs: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES (Michael J. Meyer &
W.A. Parent eds., 1992) (This volume contains a variety of essays exploring the
constitutional parameters of "human dignity.").
" 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
36 id. at 135.
3' Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 334 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring).
38 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the prosecution of a World War Two
Japanese officer for war crimes: "If we are ever to develop an orderly international
community based upon a recognition of human dignity it is of the utmost importance that the
necessary punishment of those guilty of atrocities be as free as possible from the ugly stigma
of revenge and vindictiveness," id. at 29.).
'9 See U.N. CHARTER preamble (proclaiming a determination "to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person").
40 See G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) ("All human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights.").S4 ' For a discussion of this development in international affairs, see Paust, supra note 7,
1998]
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There are a few other examples from the 1940s and early 1950s in which Justices
Felix Frankfurter42 and Robert Jackson43 referred to the individual dignity protected
by the Bill of Rights. Also in the 1950s, Justices Hugo Black" and William 0.
Douglas45 began to refer to individual dignity. Much of the discussion in this period
centered on coerced criminal confessions and improper police searches-practices,
these Justices argued, that failed to heed the balance struck between law enforcement
needs and human dignity.
There are other examples of Justices using the concept of human dignity.46 It
certainly is clear, however, that the meaning and relevance of human dignity as a
constitutional concept was far from fully developed prior to the appointment of
Justice Brennan to the Supreme Court.
II. DIGNITY AND JUSTICE BRENNAN
Justice Brennan was a Democrat appointed to the United States Supreme Court
in 1956 by Republican President Eisenhower from his position on the New Jersey
Supreme Court. Brennan served for thirty-four years until he retired in 1990. He
died in 1997.
at 146-47, 151, 185.
42 See, e.g., Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175 (1946) ("It is for them, therefore, to
choose the methods and practices by which crime is brought to book, so long as they observe
those ultimate dignities of man which the United States Constitution assures."); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943) ("A democratic society, in which respect for the
dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement
process.").
13 See, e.g., American Comm. Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 435 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
concurring and dissenting each in part) ("The public welfare ... outweighs any affront to
individual dignity.").
4 See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959):
It is just as much an affront to human dignity and just as dangerous to human
freedom for a man to be punished twice for the same offense, once by a State and
once by the United States, as it would be for one of these two Governments to
throw him in prison twice for the offense.
Id. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 798 (1950) (Black,
J., dissenting) ("Our nation proclaims a belief in the dignity of human beings as such, no
matter what their nationality or where they happen to live.").
4" See, e.g., Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 449 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("The Fifth Amendment protects the conscience and the dignity of the individual, as well as
his safety and security, against the compulsion of government."); Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156, 207 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[T]hat rule is the product of a civilization
which, by respecting the dignity even of the least worthy citizen, raises the stature of all of
us and builds an atmosphere of trust and confidence in government.").
46 See Paust, supra note 7, at 150-62 (discussing exhaustively the use of the concept of
human dignity in the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence).
[Vol. 7:1
LAW AND HUMAN DIGNITY
Brennan came from Newark where his father rose through the labor ranks to
become a labor leader.47 When it became apparent, during a 1916 trolley workers
strike, that workers had little chance of success on their picket lines because the big
corporate interests that ran the city also controlled law enforcement, the senior
Brennan ran for the city commission. By virtue of his success with the voters, he
soon became the city commissioner in charge of the police and fire departments. His
message to the voters, to his department, and to his son was simple: "A square deal
for all,'special privileges to none" 48 was his oft-used campaign slogan. Put slightly
differently, the elder Brennan urged that everyone be treated with the respect and
dignity to which they were entitled.
This influence, frankly, is as close as one can come to finding an explanation for
the origins of Brennan's concern with individual dignity. In the story of Justice
Brennan, there is neither a defining philosophical moment nor an epiphany when the
close reading of Jefferson, Madison, or Locke, or the teaching of Harvard Law
Professors Felix Frankfurter or Zechariah Chafee49 suddenly revealed to him an
inherent purpose or for in Constitution. Neither did Brennan resort to a clearly
defined school of philosophical thought. Immanuel Kant often is credited with
elevating the importance of human dignity on the world stage,5" but there is no
evidence that Kant influenced Brennan. Brennan is not one who obviously invokes
the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, or who finds his philosophical
guidance in natural law or in the teachings of God and religion. There can be little
doubt though, that his socially progressive Catholic upbringing influenced him.
Yet, in his first speech for which there is a text available, Brennan was already
on the path that he would later follow while on the United States Supreme Court. in
a speech delivered in 1954 to the Irish Charitable Society in Boston on St. Patrick's
Day,5' he said "[W]e cannot and must not doubt our strength to conserve, without the
4' For a brief summary of this background, see Stephen J. Wermiel, The Nomination of
Justice Brennan: Eisenhower's Mistake? A Look at the Historical Record, I1 CONST.
COMMENTARY 515, 516 (1994). See also Stephen Wermiel, William J. Brennan, Jr., in THE
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1995, at 446-47 (Clare
Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995).
48 THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 47, at 447. See also, e.g., Murray and
Brennan Present Municipal Views, NEWARK EVENING NEWS, May 5, 1925, at 11.
'9 Brennan attended Harvard Law School from 1928 to 1931. He studied Equity with
Chafee during his second and third years and Public Utilities with Frankfurter during his third
year. See Letter from Annie C. Bombard, Associate Registrar, Harvard Law School to
Stephen J. Wermiel (Aug. 1, 1990) (on file with author).
" See A.l. Melden, Dignity, Worth, and Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, supra
note 34, at 29 ("The familiar talk about the dignity and worth of the person is usually
associated in the philosophical literature with Immanuel Kant's discussion of these topics in
the second and third sections of The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Ethics."). Melden
says, "Hence it is that Kant declares that the basis of the dignity of human beings-a dignity
possessed even by the servile slave-is their autonomy, their determination in moral matters
by their own rational nature." Id. at 31.
"' William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Irish Charitable Society in Boston (Mar. 17,
1998l
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sacrifice of any, all of the guarantees of justice and fair play and simple human
dignity which have made our land what it is."52 Later in the same speech-two years
before he joined the Supreme Court-Brennan referred to ours as "a system of
government based upon the dignity and inviolability of the individual soul."53
Even with this early exposition of an interest in protecting human dignity,
Brennan's views developed slowly and on two separate tracks. Brennan used the
phrase "human dignity" less often in his Court opinions than he did in speeches at
law schools and before bar groups. There are numerous instances in which
Brennan's discussion of human dignity seems to be an ex post facto attempt to
provide a unifying theme for his jurisprudence. Nonetheless, even if Brennan was
more sparing in his judicial reliance on this concept, the central point remains that
he expanded the uses of the concept of human dignity in United States jurisprudence.
For Brennan, it became an essential focus of our understanding of the Constitution's
guarantee of liberty and due process; and he expressed this view in his speeches and
opinions. It remains a core part of our constitutional value system today.
While the invocation of human dignity as a justification for rights is always
controversial in this country, the vitality of this concept is still very much apparent
in the leading international law human rights documents such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. n Professor Louis Henkin of Columbia Law School
has argued that international conceptions of human dignity have outpaced the
capacity of the United States to give meaning to the phrase. 5
Ill. EXAMINING BRENNAN'S ROLE
A closer look at Brennan's use of the critical concept of human dignity in
speeches and opinions is necessary. There are also a number of ways in which this
concept may have influenced Brennan even when he did not say so--that is, when
he did not use the term "human dignity."
As a Justice, Brennan first used the term dignity in an important speech in which
he described Madison, but could have been referring to himself. For Madison,
Brennan said in his 1961 speech outlining the importance of applying the Bill of
Rights to the states through the Due Process Clause, "the suppression of individuality
was the deadly enemy of the spirit, making a mockery of the dignity of man. '"56
1954) (on file with author). The only known publication of the text of the speech is in
Brennan's Supreme Court confirmation hearing transcript. See Nomination of William Joseph
Brennan, Jr.: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 8 (1957)
[hereinafter NOMINATION HEARINGS].
52 NOMINATION HEARINGS, supra note 51, at 11-12.
53 Id. at 12.
4 See supra note 40.
5 See Louis Henkin, Human Dignity and Constitutional Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION
OF RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 210. Henkin says, "Once the United States set the world a
standard, the standard of freedom and equality; now the world is showing us a standard of
human dignity that includes also the obligation to satisfy basic human needs." Id. at 228.
56 William J. Brennan, Jr., James Madison Lecture at the New York University School
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The Madison Lecture was a highly visible and prestigious occasion.
Commentators paid much less attention to a speech Brennan gave later the same year
in Newark to the Morrow Citizens Association on Correction. The speech, which
elaborated on Brennan's thinking, was entitled, "The Essential Dignity of Man."57
Describing the rights of the accused criminal, Brennan said, "All of these safeguards
stem from the firm conviction of a free society that these safeguards are essential to
preserve simple human dignity."" He concluded with what seems, with the benefit
of hindsight, a profound statement of judicial philosophy: "The dignity of man is
therefore to be prized more today than ever before."59 "Simply stated," Brennan said,
"the Morrow Association, as are the New Jersey courts, and as I hope is the Supreme
Court of the United States, is engaged in assuring the dignity, the worth and value of
the individual."' Made only five years into his lengthy tenure, this assertion is one
of the clearest and strongest Brennan ever made concerning the Supreme Court's
protection of individual dignity.
The appearance of this concept in the opinions of Justice Brennan, however, was
a much slower development. In one 1959 decision, for example, Brennan's majority
opinion rejecting a constitutional double jeopardy claim prompted Justice Hugo
Black to complain in his dissent that the Court was offending basic notions of human
dignity.61
Brennan later would characterize the concept of one person, one vote, as
furthering individual dignity;62 but there was no such reference in his 1962 decision,
Baker v. Carr,63 which began the crucial process of opening federal courthouse doors
to constitutional claims of disproportionate voting districts.
Rather, it was not until he had been on the Court for a decade that Brennan
heavily relied on the concept of human dignity in a decision. In Schmerber v.
California,64he concluded that basic concepts of human dignity did not dictate the
outcome of the case. While declaring that "an overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity,"65 Brennan upheld a
compulsory blood test to check an arrested driver's alcohol level as a valid search and
seizure.
In 1970, in Goldberg v. Kelly,' it became apparent that Brennan truly was doing
something different: he was harnessing the power of the moral vision of vindicating
of Law (Feb. 15, 1961), in William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36
N.Y.U. L. REv. 761,771 (1961).
" William J. Brennan, Jr., The Essential Dignity of Man, Remarks to the Morrow
Citizens Association on Correction (Nov. 21, 1961) (copy on file with author).
58 Id. at 4.
'9 Id. at 13.
60 Id at 13.
61 See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 203 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
62 See Brennan, supra note 2, at 442.
63 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
64 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
65 Id. at 767.
66 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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human dignity and putting it to work to drive the constitutional engine in the
decisions of the Supreme Court. Up to this point, the sparse references in the Court's
history to individual dignity involved the criminal justice process. The Goldberg
holding moved the human dignity focus to a realm beyond the criminal justice
system. The decision held that welfare and other government benefits created a
statutory entitlement for the recipients; and it held that the benefits could not be cut
off or substantially altered without prior notice and a prior hearing, as required by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.6 7 "From its founding," Brennan
wrote, "the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being
of all persons within its borders."6 He explained what this notion of dignity meant
beyond the realm of criminal justice: "Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of
subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that
are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community.' '69
For Brennan, that was the moral vision in its full glory. Human dignity meant
that even the most down-trodden in our society deserved a chance to participate as
full citizens.
Not everyone saw this vision. Professor Owen Fiss of Yale Law School has
extolled the virtues of Goldberg v. Kelly as a simple and rational development of fair
procedures necessary to implement due process as required by the exigencies of the
times.7" Fiss complained that the decision should stand on this solid, rational ground
and that Brennan undercut its logic and reasoning when he described Goldberg as a
triumph of human dignity in a 1987 speech.71 Brennan entitled his speech Reason,
Passion, and the Progress of Law.72 It described the Goldberg opinion "as an
expression of the importance of passion in governmental conduct, in the sense of
attention to the concrete human realities at stake."73 Elsewhere in the speech,
Brennan made the connection between passion and individual dignity:
Whether the government treats its citizens with dignity is a question
whose answer must lie in the intricate texture of daily life. Neither a
judge nor an administrator who operates on the basis of reason alone can
67 Id. at 263-64.
68 Id. at 264-65.
69 Id. at 265.
70 See Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 794 (1990).
From my perspective, a justice charged with the duty of construing the due
process clause, as Justice Brennan was in Goldberg v. Kelly, should be seen as
engaged in a process of trying to understand what it means for a society to be
committed to procedural fairness, and to elaborate that understanding in a certain
practical context.
Id. at 794.
71 Id. at 803-04.
72 William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and the Progress of Law: The Forty-Second
Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture to the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, in
William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," 10 CARDOZO L.
REV. 3 (1988).
71 Id. at 20.
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fully grasp that answer, for each is cut off from the wellspring from which
concepts such as dignity, decency, and fairness flow. 4
Perhaps the best-known and most visibly explicit use of human dignity in
Brennan's Supreme Court decisions was in death penalty cases, in which he repeated
his vision most often, but made relatively little substantive progress in persuading
others. Brennan began to spell out his view in his separate opinion in Furman v.
Georgia,75 the Court's 1972 decision that invalidated the death penalty, albeit for
only four years. Brennan recognized that "[t]he State, even as it punishes, must treat
its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings."76 He argued that
"[a] punishment is 'cruel and unusual,' therefore, if it does not comport with human
dignity. 7 7 Brennan argued that the principle that "even the vilest criminal remains
a human being possessed of common human dignity"was at the heart of the Eighth
Amendment.78 When the Court upheld the next generation of death penalty statutes
in 1976,' 9 Brennan remained no less convinced that the law was depriving the
condemned of their basic constitutional entitlement to human dignity."0 He remained
convinced of this down to his last moments on the bench. He even dissented in one
of his last cases in 1990 "that the death penalty is wholly inconsistent with the
constitutional principle of human dignity.""1
Brennan has been criticized widely for his record of dissenting in all death
penalty cases during the fourteen years from Gregg v. Georgia until his retirement.
Harvard Law School Professor Raoul Berger often said that Brennan's view of the
death penalty was wrong as to the constitutional origins of the Eighth Amendment
guarantee against "cruel and unusual punishment," was wrong because the death
penalty was accepted by the American people for nearly two centuries before the
Supreme Court began to meddle in it, and was wrong because Brennan should have
stopped dissenting and accepted the determination by a majority of Justices that the
ultimate penalty was constitutional.8" Brennan was not fazed. In a 1985 lecture
entitled In Defense of Dissents, he replied to his critics that "when ajustice perceives
an interpretation of the text to have departed so far from its essential meaning, that
justice is bound, by a larger constitutional duty to the community, to expose the
departure and point toward a different path."83 "On this issue, the death penalty,"
74 Id. at 21-22.
" 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
76 Id. at 270.
77 Id.
8 Id. at 273.
71 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
80 See id at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 675 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82 See Raoul Berger, Justice Brennan vs. the Constitution, 29 B.C. L. REV. 787, 796-98
(1988); Raoul Berger, Justice Brennan, "Human Dignity," and Constitutional
Interpretation, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 129.
83 William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, The Mathew 0. Tobriner Memorial
Lecture, Delivered at the University of California, Hastings College of Law (Nov. 18 1985)
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Brennan said, "I hope to embody a community striving for human dignity for all,
although perhaps not yet arrived.""4
Brennan's assertion that the aim of law was to vindicate human dignity grew
stronger in his opinions over time. In 1976, when the Supreme Court in Paul v.
Davis5 found no redress for a man whose name and photograph had been included
improperly on a flyer showing shoplifters, Brennan dissented: "I have always thought
that one of this Court's most important roles is to provide a formidable bulwark
against governmental violation of the constitutional safeguards securing in our free
society the legitimate expectations of every person to innate human dignity and sense
of worth." 6
In 1984, Brennan wrote for the Court to uphold a Minnesota law that required
the Jaycees organization to admit women as a form of public accommodation. 7
Criticizing gender stereotypes that have been used to discriminate against women,
Brennan said such gender bias "deprives persons of their individual dignity and
denies society the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and cultural
life." 88
When state prison officials in New Jersey found that there was no reasonable way
they could accommodate the religious practices of Islamic inmates, the Supreme
Court agreed in a 1987 decision, O Lone v. Shabazz."9 Brennan disagreed and wrote
that, "[t]o deny the opportunity to affirm membership in a spiritual community...
may extinguish an inmate's last source of hope for dignity and redemption."' ° Also
in 1987, in United States v. Stanley9' the Supreme Court found that a former military
serviceman who was given LSD without his knowledge, as part of a secret military
experiment, could not sue for damages for violation of his constitutional rights.92 The
Court found that the remedy for a constitutional tort does not apply to military
service.9 3 Said Brennan in dissent, "Soldiers ought not to be asked to defend a
Constitution indifferent to their essential human dignity.5
94
There are two other areas of law that bear scrutiny, although they are not
examples in which Brennan expressly used the phrase "human dignity." Instead,
(on file with author), reprinted in William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37
HASTINGS L.J. 427, 437 (1986).
84 Id. This passage appears in the original text of Brennan's speech immediately following
the text accompanying note 83, supra, but is omitted from the Hastings Law Journal version.
This passage also appears in another published version of the speech. See William J.
Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, PA. GAZETTE, Feb. 1986, at 20, 23.
85 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
86 Id. at 734-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
88 Id. at 625.
89 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
90 Id. at 368 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
483 U.S. 669 (1987).
92 See id at 678-84.
93 See id at 684.
14 Id. at 708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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they are lines of cases that were very important to him and that may well have been
influenced by his moral vision of law and human dignity. The first is the line of
cases involving government accountability to individuals, sometimes called
constitutional torts. Brennan wrote the majority opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown
NamedAgents95 in 1971, in which the Court found that a person arrested in his home
by federal narcotics agents without anyjustification could sue for damages under the
Fourth Amendment.96 He expanded this principle in 1979 in Davis v. Passman,97 to
allow suit under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause by a woman who
accused the congressman for whom she worked of discriminating against her on the
basis of her gender.9 It was Brennan, as well, who in 1978 wrote the lead opinion
in Monell v. Department of Social Services,99 which held that local governments
could be sued for civil rights violations under section 1983 as "persons" who were
acting under color of state law.100
Taken together, these cases establish a powerful right of citizens to hold their
government accountable for individual harms. This was a marked departure from the
more traditional democratic approach that says United States citizens hold the
government accountable collectively by exercising the will of the majority at the
ballot box. Brennan's vision is that government also must be accountable to the
individual for the harms to that individual and must pay damages when appropriate.
While Brennan never expressly said so in public, it clearly is plausible that the
motivation for this line of cases is the same one outlined in this essay. For Brennan,
it was a core part of the dignity of an individual in a democratic society that prizes
the right of each citizen, and not just the will of the majority, to be able to seek
individual vindication from government for wrongs done to that person.
Asked about the origin of his commitment to human dignity, on one occasion
Brennan made this connection. For him, the analysis was "how people ought to be
treated by authority and how the rights of people should be respected by authority.
I always couch it in the [terms that] society's basic value is enhancing human dignity.
And that covers so much."'' 1
It is possible to see in Brennan a similar moral justification for his unwavering
effort to reinvigorate the procedure of habeas corpus. This again is illustrated in a
line of cases in which Brennan never specifically used the words "human dignity."
But beginning with his 1963 opinion Fay v. Noia, °2 some aspects of which have now
95 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
96 See id. at 397.
97 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
98 See id. at 248-49.
99 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
'oo See id. at 700-01.
"' These comments were made to the author in one of more than 60 tape-recorded
interviews with Justice Brennan between 1986 and his death in 1997. Interview #60 by
Stephen J. Wermiel with William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, United States Supreme
Court, Washington, D.C. (May 2, 1990) (transcript on file with author).
102 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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been overruled, °3 Brennan articulated a consistent view that the writ of habeas
corpus allowed vigorous and substantial federal court review of state criminal court
proceedings," 4 and that the writ must be given broad leeway to hold the criminal
justice system accountable for errors and unconstitutional procedures.0 5 Like the
constitutional tort cases, this line of cases makes most sense when understood as an
essential component of a scheme to vindicate human dignity. A core part of the
notion of human dignity is that persons convicted of crimes should have some redress
for misconduct committed in the course of their convictions. Of course, the writ goes
back centuries and there is no need here to rewrite British or American history to
suggest that it had its origin in notions of human dignity. The point is only that it
would help to explain Brennan's unwavering commitment to and deep-seated belief
in the writ of habeas corpus which took second place to no one in the history of the
Supreme Court.
IV. CRITICIZING THE BRENNAN VIEW
Numerous scholars have focused on the problems with Brennan's vision of law
and human dignity. The following list is not exhaustive, but mentions a few
prominent criticisms.
First, there is the criticism that Brennan's vision of human dignity was self-
serving. Pro-life scholars have wondered how he could see himself as a protector of
human dignity and ignore the dignity of the unborn fetus. 6 His answer, which
certainly would not satisfy his critics, surely would have been that he was concerned
with the dignity of the woman who faced the choice of whether to continue her
pregnancy and that the fetus never was determined to be a person within the meaning
of the Constitution. However difficult and controversial this balance may have been,
once Brennan made it he never looked back.
A second problem involves the area of free speech. Those who advocate
protection of the interests of the community fairly may ask how First Amendment
protection for offensive, unwanted, or hateful speech advances the interests of human
dignity. 7 For Brennan, it was the ability of the speaker to speak that was at the core
103 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,749-51 (1991) (limiting Fay to its facts
and applying the "cause and prejudice" standard, rather than Fay's "deliberate bypass"
standard, to federal habeas corpus review of state proceedings).
104 See Fay, 372 U.S. at 406.
'o' See id. at 422.
106 See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon & Eric W. Treene, Selective Humanism: The Legacy of
Justice William Brennan, HUM. LIFE REV., Winter 1998, at 65, 75 ("He was a man of many
talents who often professed his dedication to human dignity .... Somehow, this man,
remembered by so many for his personal warmth and compassion, became complicit in the
slaughter of innocents.").
107 The works of Professors Richard Delgado, Mari Matsuda, Charles Lawrence, and
Owen Fiss, among others, raise these concerns. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Are Hate-Speech
Rules Constitutional Heresy? A Reply to Steven Gey, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1998); Owen
M. Fiss, The Supreme Court and the Problem of Hate Speech, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 281
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of the ideal of human dignity. In this respect, as in numerous others, it was the
individual's dignity that he sought to protect, even in the face of-or perhaps
especially in the face of-the countervailing interests of the majority that found the
speech unwanted or offensive." 8
Yet another concern is the question of where one finds the standards of human
dignity to apply. It is a difficult question, but Brennan would say that these standards
were discernible in evolving standards of decency and that this enterprise was not
very different from the many formulations other Justices have used to find meaning
in the Due Process Clause---"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"' °9 is the most
frequently cited formulation.
Finally, as already discussed, there are those who would ask skeptically, "What
do you mean moral vision? What relevance does moral vision have to the process of
constitutional interpretation?" Judge Frank Easterbrook of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit made precisely this point when he said, "When
we observe that the Constitution ... stands for 'human dignity' but not rules, we
have destroyed the basis for judicial review."''0
These criticisms never shook Brennan's faith. His answer, in a 1987 speech at
Columbia Law School,"' was that the reading of human dignity into the Constitution
was not new or in any way unique to him. He thought it was a transcendent value
embedded in the Constitution: "The vision of human dignity embodied in our
Constitution throughout most of its interpretive history is, at least for me, deeply
moving. It is timeless. It has inspired citizens of this country and others for two
centuries.""'
(1995); Charles R. Lawrence, 1II, Crossburning and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination
Theory and the First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REV. 787 (1992); Mari J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
018 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that a conviction for burning the
United States flag was inconsistent with the First Amendment).
109 Palko V. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), discussed supra in text accompanying
notes 32 and 33.
I 0 Raoul Berger, Justice Brennan, "Human Dignity, " and Constitutional Interpretation,
in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 34,
at 130 n.2 (quoting Judge Frank Easterbrook, Approaches to Judicial Review, in POLITICS
AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE NATURE OF AND EXTENT OF INTERPRETATION 17,29 (American
Studies Center ed., 1990)).
. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Worldwide Influence of the United States Constitution
as a Charter of Human Rights, Lecture delivered at Columbia Law School Bicentennial
Celebration (Nov. 20, 1987) (copy on file with author).
112 Id. at 10.
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V. CONCLUSION
There is no richer discourse on the scope and breadth of Justice Brennan's moral
vision than his own discussion in a 1985 speech on constitutional interpretation
delivered at the Georgetown University Law Center:" 3
Indeed, it is because we recognize that incarceration strips a man of his
dignity that we demand strict adherence to fair procedure and proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before taking such a drastic step....
There is no worse injustice than wrongly to strip a man of his dignity.
And our adherence to the constitutional vision of human dignity is so
strict that even after convicting a person according to these stringent
standards, we demand that his dignity be infringed only to the extent
appropriate to the crime and never by means of wanton infliction of pain
or deprivation. I interpret the Constitution plainly to embody these
fundamental values.
Of course, the constitutional vision of human dignity has, in this past
quarter-century, infused far more than our decisions about the criminal
process. Recognition of the principle of "one person, one vote" as a
constitutional principle redeems the promise of self-governance by
affirming the essential dignity of every citizen in the right to equal
participation in the democratic process. Recognition of so-called "new
property" rights in those receiving government entitlements affirms the
essential dignity of the least fortunate among us by demanding that
government treat with decency, integrity, and consistency those dependent
on its benefits for their very survival. After all, a legislative majority
initially decides to create governmental entitlements; the Constitution's
due process clause merely provides protection for entitlements thought
necessary by society as a whole. Such due process rights prohibit
government from imposing the devil's bargain of bartering away human
dignity in exchange for human sustenance. Likewise, recognition of full
equality for women-equal protection of the laws---ensures that gender
has no bearing on claims to human dignity.
Recognition of broad and deep rights of expression and of conscience
reaffirm the vision of human dignity in many ways. These rights redeem
the promise of self-governance by facilitating-indeed
demanding-robust, uninhibited, and wide-open debate on issues of
public importance. Such public debate is vital to the development and
dissemination of political ideas. As importantly, robust public discussion
is the crucible in which personal political convictions are forged. In our
democracy, such discussion is a political duty; it is the essence of self-
government. The constitutional vision of human dignity rejects the
possibility of political orthodoxy imposed from above; it respects the
13 See supra note 1.
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rights of each individual to form and to express political judgments,
however far they may deviate from the mainstream and however
unsettling they might be to the powerful or the elite....
I do not mean to suggest that we have in the last quarter-century
achieved a comprehensive definition of the constitutional ideal of human
dignity. We are still striving toward that goal, and doubtless it will be an
eternal quest. For if the interaction of this Justice and the constitutional
text over the years confirms any single proposition, it is that the demands
of human dignity will never cease to evolve.'
"' Brennan, supra note 2, at 442-43.
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